1	
2	
3	
4	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6	SOUTHERN DIVISION
7	
8	THE HONORABLE JAMES V. SELNA, JUDGE PRESIDING
9	
10	DAVID ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, vs.
11	SACR-10-00031-JVS
12	CHRISTOPHER COX, et al., Defendants.
13	
14	
15	
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
17	Santa Ana, California
18	August 2, 2010
19	
20	CHADON A CEEEENC DDD
21	SHARON A. SEFFENS, RPR United States Courthouse
22	411 West 4th Street, Suite 1-1053 Santa Ana, CA 92701 (714) 543-0870
23	(/14) 343-00/0
24	
25	

```
1
     APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
 2
     For the Plaintiffs:
 3
     A. CLIFTON HODGES
     HODGES AND ASSOCIATES
 4
     4 East Holly Street, Suite 202
     Pasadena, CA 91103
 5
     (626) 564-9797
 6
     For the Defendants:
     ANDRE BIROTTE, JR.
     United States Attorney
 8
     LEON W. WEIDMAN
     Assistant United States Attorney
 9
     Chief, Civil Division
     KEITHM. STAUB
     Assistant United States Attorney
10
     Room 7516 Federal Building
     300 North Los Angeles Street
11
     Los Angeles, CA 90012
12
     (213) 894-7423
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

```
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; MONDAY, AUGUST 2, 2010; P.M. SESSION
 1
 2
               THE CLERK: Item No. 15, SACV-10-00031-JVS, David
 3
     Anderson, Lt. Col., et al., versus Christopher Cox, et al.
 4
               Counsel, please step forward and state your
 5
     appearances for the record.
 6
               MR. HODGES: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
 7
     Clifton Hodges on behalf of the plaintiffs.
               MR. STAUB: Good afternoon, Your Honor. assistant
 8
 9
     United States Attorney Keith Staub on behalf of the federal
10
     defendants.
11
               THE COURT: Good afternoon.
12
               Have you both had a change to review the
13
     tentative?
14
               MR. STAUB: Yes.
15
               THE COURT: Mr. Hodges, I think I would like to
16
     hear from you first, please.
17
               MR. HODGES: Your Honor, first of all, let me
18
     concede a point raised in your tentative that this is not
19
     your usual Bivens case. That's clear to everyone I think.
20
               As a housekeeping matter, I would indicate on page
     one there is a typographical error. In the middle
21
22
     paragraph, the administrative law judge finding was in 2005,
23
     not in 2010.
24
               THE COURT: Thank you.
25
               MR. HODGES: Having said that, let me turn to the
```

second issue raised by the government first, and that's the question about whether or not there are property rights at issue in this case. Very simply what we have alleged is that — let me back up a second. We have alleged a scheme in effect that is a sting operation judged from the outside and not from the inside. Basically the sting operation was an operation put into effect through the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the SEC commissioners.

What we have alleged is that the SEC commissioners as opposed to the Agency itself coordinated with these other institutions and at their request and in concert with them began a program whereby this company was raided. The SEC Commission was fully aware at all times of the amount of naked shorting that was going on in this company. The then chairman of the Commission has been quoted on several occasions as saying this was the most heavily naked shorted company in the history of the world.

As we have alleged in our complaint, on one day, which I believe was sometime in April of 2005, more than 90 billion shares of this company traded in one day. I have testimony from — which is not alluded to in our current complaint, but I can provide testimony from registered ANSD companies that were in business at this time who report that they were told it's free money. You can sell as many shares

as you can find buyers for and put all of the money in your pocket. You don't have to ever buy the shares. They were on a no borrow list to begin with at that point in time, which was in 2005 primarily, and if you were going to borrow shares as a legitimate broker at that point in time they had a \$2.50 requirement for buying -- or for borrowing.

You can imagine what -- I think the average during that period was 17 billion shares a day being sold. This is an enormous amount of money for people to be borrowing shares to be sold into the market. They were being sold for nothing. That's how they drove this company into the ground. They did it because there was evidence by the government and by others associated both directly and indirectly with the government that this money was being sent offshore. It was being accumulated by hedge funds offshore. It was being sent to Iraq. It was being sent to Iran. It was being sent to Afganistan. This is one of the means which these terrorist organizations were utilizing to fund their operation.

Having said that, I recognized when I prepared this complaint that at the time the company was delisted, and at the time that this original agreement was made we did not have a basis to sue the SEC, the SEC commissioners, or anybody else because in fact as the Court correctly pointed out in that regard -- the Broad versus Sealaska case I think

says that shareholders don't have the right. They don't have a property interest. They did not have that right at the time the agreement was made and at the time the original criminal acts by these commissioners took place. However, what this complaint speaks to is at quite a later date after the company was delisted in October 2005 and they stipulated to that delistment.

Then we go forward, and what immediately happened was a task force, including one of the primary and past board of director members, Mr. Bob Maheu, who is no longer with us unfortunately, became the head of that task force. His appointed duties — his task force appointed duties were to have the shareholders have full copies of their shares, full certificates for every share that was legitimately then owned because it had been bought and paid for and based upon that share certificate pool to then around and liquidate the company.

At the time that the company decided it was going to liquidate itself and distribute its remaining assets to its shareholders, the property rights attached to each of the shareholders because at that point in time, which was in early 2006, they had a right to believe that what was in their future was a prorata per share distribution for the assets that the company then owned. The company then owned all of these monies that had been accumulated and put in the

trust. The company also owned shares of stock in a company called Entourage, and they had other assets. They did not have any substantial liabilities, so the shareholders from that point forward had a property right that is protectable under the Constitution. It is that claim that we are making in our complaint.

Having said that, once we get past the property right issue, I certainly understand the Court's concern and I have reviewed my complaint about perhaps the use of some inartful language when I referred to the SEC rather than specifying that it was the SEC commissioners that we are aiming this at. The reason we are aiming it only at the SEC commissioners is because under the statutory scheme that was set up after the first great depression the SEC Commission and the commissioners individually have the sole and exclusive right to make the decisions.

For example, with this firm, when this company was delisted in October 2005, it was pursuant to an administrative law hearing that took place here in Los Angeles all day down in the Federal Court that I attended. The administrative law judge then rendered a tentative decision. It was her decision, but it was tentative in the sense that it had no power and had no effect. The only time that it became effective and the company became delisted was on October 24th or 25th of that

year when the Commission met and together agreed that this company should be delisted.

They are the only people who have the power to make these kinds of decisions. They are the people who spoke to the other governmental agencies and to the people representing ostensibly the company at that point in time when this agreement to utilize this company without knowledge of the shareholders in part of a sting operation to trap all these hedge fund people, which started way back in 2004, but it was those commissioners acting in an improper and probably criminal way because their mandate under the law is to protect shareholders. They were doing exactly the opposite. They were entering into an agreement they knew was going to damage the shareholders. It was going to drive this company out of business, which it did, and without notice. It was a big secret.

It was only those commissioners who took that action that we are aiming this complaint at. We have named the commissioners who have sat since that time, because it is our position that having denied these people payment, these commissioners have signed on, ratified the acts of their fellow criminals, and at the end of the day refused to release this money, money that has been collected. We are not suing the SEC. We are not suing the government.

THE COURT: Who in your analysis is the trustee of

```
the funds? Who holds the funds?
 1
 2
               MR. HODGES: There are actual several trustees who
 3
     hold the funds, one is whom currently is the DTCC, and I
     only say that because I know the funds are deposited with
 4
 5
     the DTCC.
 6
               THE COURT: Spin that out for me, that acronym.
               MR. HODGES: The Depository Trust Clearing
 8
     Corporation. They are the clearing house for all of the
 9
     financial transactions basically that take place in the
     United States.
10
11
               THE COURT: Private or public?
12
               MR. HODGES: It is a private company, but they act
13
     as a public one.
14
               THE COURT: Well, as opposed to a governmental
15
     agency.
16
               MR. HODGES: It's not a governmental agency in the
17
     same sense that the federal reserve banks are not
18
     governmental agencies.
19
               THE COURT: What document governs the terms under
20
     which they hold those funds?
2.1
               MR. HODGES: A trust agreement.
22
               THE COURT: Between?
23
               MR. HODGES: Between the people who originally set
24
     this up, one of whom was Bob Maheu.
25
               THE COURT: As an employee of the SEC?
```

MR. HODGES: Not as an employee of the SEC in any sense of the word. He was at one time on the board of directors of the company CMKM Diamonds. He never acted on behalf of the SEC.

2.1

THE COURT: What control does the SEC have over this trust fund?

MR. HODGES: They don't have any direct control over the trust fund. The agreement, however, that was originally entered into as I understand the testimonial evidence that I have been able to accumulate without the opportunity to do actual discovery — my understanding is that Bob Maheu and several of his associates entered into a deal first with the Department of Justice. They got the SEC on board through the commissioners by talking to several defendants, primarily Christopher Cox who is a named defendant.

The essence of the agreement they made was that in order to make this thing effective the company would go and pump its stock up, which it did. The government would assist in that operation, which it did.

THE COURT: How?

MR. HODGES: There is evidence that they paid for some of the expenses associated with a drag racing car that had CMKX painted on the outside of it that was being very publicly bantied about on the Internet and raced in various

escrow company.

jurisdictions. One of their ex-employees, a gentleman named Roger Glenn, who was an attorney or used to be an attorney in New York with the law firm of Angels & Edwards, signed on to increase the stock at the request of the SEC I am told.

He came into CMKX in 2004, and when he arrived there, the number of authorized shares of the company were on the order of either 100 billion or 200 billion. I forget exactly what. When he left some nine or ten months later, the authorized shares had illegally and improperly under every law I am aware of had been raised to 800 billion shares. This company eventually sold some 700 billion shares of stock, and there is over that many outstanding at the moment, 703 billion plus.

THE COURT: Why isn't your claim against the clearing house asking the trustee for these funds?

MR. HODGES: Because that would be like suing the

THE COURT: But if the escrow company has the

funds -- MR. HODGES: Here is the simple answer as I

started to say a few minutes ago, and I probably did not finish. The original agreement — there was a war that ensued after the sting got under operation, because what the sting always contemplated was that Mr. Maheu would collect all of these bad doers — the hedge fund people and the

people like Waterhouse and all the other stockbrokerage houses around who were naked shorting this company, collect them all in a big room and offer them a deal for two reasons: first of all, to collect money for CMKX for what had been done to them in effect; second of all, to teach these people a lesson that there were people out there watching what was going on, and hopefully that would head them off in continuing in such illicit, illegal, and improper behavior.

That was in fact done, and I have a witness who was there when it was done. They had a room about three times the size of your courtroom in which they had representatives from all these brokerages from all over the world who were there present. They watched a video presentation, because Mr. Maheu as the Court may be aware was at one time closely associated with the CIA and Howard Hughes and all kinds of other people.

THE COURT: I was going to ask you if it was the same Robert Maheu.

MR. HODGES: It is indeed the same one, a gentleman I happened to make acquaintanceship with in the '70s. At any rate, all of these people were accumulated in this room, and they were shown a video and a slide presentation of all of the evidence of their wrongdoing, and they were offered an opportunity that you could either step

up and sign away your money and pay a reasonable amount for each transaction that you did illegally and improperly, or you can walk out of here and get prosecuted and go to jail because what you did is criminal. Every single person in that room stepped and made a deal.

After that time, they became a big conflict between the SEC commissioners and the other governmental entries who were supporting the SEC commissioners about who was going to have the right to release this money to the shareholders and when. My understanding is this went on for some number of months, but ultimately the SEC commissioners prevailed and convinced Mr. Maheu and his associates that it had to be their decision because only they and the rest of the government could determine whether the sting had fulfilled its function.

That was the basis upon which he gave them the power to make this decision about when the money is to be released. It's my understanding that every trust that is currently being held for release of this money is being held by a person who was sworn to observe that requirement, that the SEC and the U.S. Government, whoever is going to make this payment, goes first. My information is that it was the SEC commissioners who have this power, and that's why they are defendants in this case.

THE COURT: Let's return to your Bivens theory.

It's a taking claim.

MR. HODGES: It is. This money was supposed to have been released within a year of the time that the company was originally delisted in October 2005. This is now almost October of 2010, some four years past that time. It is a taking only because they refuse — notwithstanding information that they have continued to give to various shareholders, they continue to refuse to release this money. If they don't release the money, then it's a taking because they are preventing what is rightfully ours for us to receive. That's why it is a taking.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Staub.

MR. STAUB: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'll submit that much of what I have just heard I have heard for the first time because most of it wasn't pled in the complaint.

THE COURT: I found it very educational.

MR. STAUB: Indeed. True or not, I don't know, but we are here to discuss what's in the complaint today. We are not here to give oral argument and present testimony about facts that no one has any idea about, certainly not myself. We are here to talk about what's in the complaint, whether it's properly pled under Rule 8, under the Iqbal decision, and under Twombly. As this Court pointed out in

the tentative, it's not properly pled.

THE COURT: I'm satisfied with that in the tentative. The best case for the plaintiff here would be to dismiss with leave to replead. I guess what I am really interested in is whether this is a Bivens claim given the nature of the asset and whether sovereign immunity applies.

MR. STAUB: I suppose you could sue a government officical under Bivens for any violation of civil rights whether it has to do with money or not. I don't know that. I don't know any distinguishing facts in this case that would prevent them from being sued individually under Bivens if there are sufficient facts pled.

THE COURT: Well, do you concede in theory that a constitutional violation of a taking clause could be asserted against an individual government worker in his individual capacity?

MR. STAUB: I haven't researched that, so I don't know the answer to that specifically. I think we asserted in our brief that there is no vested property right because pursuant to the complaint the SEC had the discretion to release funds if in fact there are these funds in existence. That discretion alone under the case law that we have cited suggests that they don't have any property right to it, but in answer to your, I don't know.

THE COURT: Well, there are two questions I guess.

One, is there a property right and if it's a contingent asset, if you will, subject to distribution per the plaintiffs at the will of the Commission? But there is a separate issue as to whether the nature of relief sought here is such that it can only be asserted against the commissioners in their official capacity.

MR. STAUB: I don't think the government has waived sovereign immunity in their official capacity in any way.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that, but the issue is is there some manner in which these claims could be asserted against the individual defendants in their individual capacity, or is the relief sought by definition relief that it can only be sought against them in their official capacity, in which case, there would be no private claim, and they would be entitled to sovereign immunity in their officical capacity?

MR. STAUB: That may be the case. I don't know the answer.

I do want to -- well, I think the Court is inclined to be consistent with its tentative as far as the pleading requirements. I think that the plaintiff has an opportunity to replead to amend the complaint. We will certainly deal with that issue if it's raisded on further briefing. I imagine there will be an additional motion to

dismiss in the future.

That being said, clearly these are high level government officials. They don't deserve to be sued and discovery taken of them unless specific allegations have been made, and none have been made in this complaint. I have heard some issues that were addressed during oral argument. I didn't see those in the complaint, but even assuming those are true, there is nothing specific as to these SEC commissioners other than the fact that they somehow have the sole discretion to make every single decision at the SEC. I don't buy that.

THE COURT: Would you agree that it might be easier to assess whether claims can be asserted against the commissioners as individuals if we had a complaint that complied with Iqbal?

MR. STAUB: That may be true, yes, if in fact they comply with the pleading requirements of Iqbal and they get past qualified immunity, which we also raised, and the Court obviously doesn't need to address right now, but if and when the Court decides it's been properly pled, then I think qualified immunity should be addressed.

THE COURT: What I am inclined is to dismiss with leave to replead for failure to meet the Rule 8 requirements and not -- and to dismiss the claims against them in their official capacity as a matter of sovereign immunity and

```
1
     leave the other issues until we have got a pleading that
 2
     passes muster.
 3
               MR. STAUB: Agreed. I would only ask that the
     government have 30 days to respond to the amended complaint.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Thank you.
 6
               Mr. Hodges.
               MR. HODGES: I certainly recognize the need to be
 8
     more specific in the complaint, and I appreciate the Court's
 9
     willingness to give us the opportunity.
10
               THE COURT: How much time do you want?
               MR. HODGES: Forty-five days would be helpful.
11
12
               THE COURT: Any objection?
13
               MR. STAUB:
                          No.
               THE COURT: And then 30 days to respond by answer
14
15
     of a motion.
16
               MR. HODGES: That's fine.
17
               THE COURT: Okay. Then we will modify the
18
     tentative accordingly.
19
                                 -000-
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Date: October 4, 2010 Sharon A. Seffens 10/4/10 SHARON A. SEFFENS, U.S. COURT REPORTER